February 26, 2024

Delaware Court of Chancery Rejects Validity of “New Wave” Stockholder Agreement Terms that Constrain Traditional Board Authority

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Founders and controlling stockholders often seek to retain control over their companies even after taking them public, typically via high-vote share classes or, as was at issue in this case, via stockholder agreements granting the pre-IPO owners broad governance rights.
 
In West Palm Beach Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Moelis & Company, the Delaware Court of Chancery recently held that a “new wave” stockholder agreement between Moelis & Company (the “Company”) and its founder, CEO, and board chairman, Ken Moelis was invalid under Section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (the “DGCL”) because it contained  “pre-approval rights” over a number of corporate actions, required the board to recommend individuals designated by Moelis for a majority of directorships and fill committee positions and board vacancies with Moelis designees, impermissibly constraining the board’s ability to manage the business and affairs of the company—powers the statute does not allow the board to delegate via contract. 
 
Moelis is a strong reminder that the foundation of the corporate form in Delaware is the independent authority of a board of directors, elected by stockholders and entrusted to manage the business and affairs of the corporation as fiduciaries. Delaware will not permit this foundation to be eroded through contractual arrangements with stockholders.

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