

International Comparative Legal Guides



Lending & Secured Finance 2021

A practical cross-border insight into lending and secured finance

Ninth Edition

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A Comparative Overview of Transatlantic Intercreditor Agreements

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Introduction

The intercreditor frameworks applicable to a given financing structure in a particular market are often fairly settled, but in cross-border financings for European borrowers or other financings involving practitioners and business people in different parts of the world, deal parties may have different expectations as to the key intercreditor terms that ought to apply.

In this chapter, we will compare and contrast the key terms in U.S. second lien and European second lien intercreditors and discuss the blended approach taken in some recent intercreditor agreements for financings of European companies in the U.S. syndicated bank loan markets. Similar dynamics may be involved when documenting intercreditor agreements involving other non-U.S. jurisdictions as well, but for ease of reference, we will refer to these intercreditor agreements as “Transatlantic Intercreditor Agreements”.

Assumptions

U.S. second lien intercreditors are predicated on two key assumptions: *first*, that the business will be reorganised pursuant to Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (Chapter 11); and *second*, that the first lien lenders will receive the benefits of a comprehensive guarantee and collateral package (including shares, cash, receivables and tangible assets) pursuant to secured transactions laws that effectively provide creditors with the ability to take a security interest in “all assets” of the borrower and guarantors. European second lien intercreditors, in contrast, (i) assume that it is unlikely that the borrower and guarantors will be reorganised in an orderly court-approved process and indeed more likely that, since there is no pan-European insolvency regime (and thus no pan-European automatic stay on enforcement of claims), the intercreditor terms will have to function in the context of potentially multiple and disparate insolvency proceedings (ideally outside of insolvency proceedings altogether), and (ii) contemplate that not all assets of the borrower and guarantors will be subject to the liens of the first lien and second lien secured parties. As a result, one of the key goals that European second lien intercreditors seek to facilitate is a swift out-of-court, out-of-bankruptcy, enforcement sale (or “pre-pack”) resulting in a financial restructuring where the business is sold as a going concern on a “debt-free basis”, with “out of the money” junior creditors’ claims being released and so removed from the financing structure.

Overview

The first lien/second lien relationship in the U.S. closely resembles the senior/second lien relationship in Europe; however, for the reasons stated above, the key terms of U.S. second lien and

European second lien intercreditors have been constructed on the basis of different assumptions, which therefore results in significant intercreditor differences.

European second lien intercreditor agreements typically combine claim subordination, payment blockages, lien subordination, broad enforcement standstill provisions restricting the junior lien creditors’ ability to take enforcement action (not only with respect to collateral but also with respect to debt and guarantee claims) and extensive release mechanics. U.S. second lien intercreditors establish lien subordination, which regulates the rights of the U.S. second lien creditors with respect to collateral only, and include an enforcement standstill with respect to actions against collateral only, although there are generally protections against junior lien creditors receiving value in their capacity as an unsecured creditor that would be prohibited by the terms of the lien subordination (such as take-back equity that is not otherwise first issued to senior lien creditors). U.S. second lien intercreditors do not generally include payment or claim subordination and they rely heavily on waivers of the junior lien creditors’ rights as secured creditors under Chapter 11.

European second lien intercreditors often have their original genesis in the Loan Market Association’s form (the “LMA”), but are negotiated on a deal-by-deal basis. By contrast, there is no market standard first lien/second lien intercreditor agreement in the U.S., although the American Bar Association published a model first lien/second lien intercreditor agreement in May 2010 intended as guidance for secured creditor constituencies in the U.S. market.

As discussed below, recent intercreditors for financings of European companies in the U.S. syndicated bank loan markets vary even more significantly.

Key Terms of U.S. Second Lien Intercreditor Agreements and European Second Lien Intercreditor Agreements

1. Parties to the Intercreditor Agreement

U.S. second lien intercreditors are generally executed by the first lien agent and the second lien agent and executed or acknowledged by the borrower and, sometimes, the guarantors. In the current market, intercreditor agreements frequently allow for representatives of future classes of first lien and second lien debt permitted by the debt documentation to accede to the intercreditor agreement. U.S. second lien intercreditors also typically allow for refinancings of the first lien and second lien debt.

By contrast, the parties to European second lien intercreditors generally include a longer list of signatories. In addition to the first lien agent and initial lenders, the second lien agent and

initial lenders and the obligors, the obligors' hedge providers, ancillary facility lenders, the lenders of intra-group loans, the lenders of shareholder loans and the security agent will execute a European-style intercreditor agreement. The longer list of parties to European second lien intercreditors is largely driven by the senior creditors' desire to ensure that, after giving effect to the senior lenders' enforcement, the borrower group is free and clear of all claims (both secured and unsecured) against the borrower and guarantors coupled with a preference to ensure that any enforcement action by creditors is choreographed in a manner which maximises recoveries for the senior secured creditors (and thus indirectly for all creditors). It has become common for refinancing and incremental structural debt to be permitted in European deals. European intercreditors typically require such debt to be subject to the intercreditor agreement, although the treatment of unsecured debt can be subject to negotiation.

Hedge obligations are generally included as first lien obligations under U.S. second lien intercreditors, but hedge counterparties are not directly party to U.S. second lien intercreditors. By accepting the benefits of the first priority lien of the first lien agent, the hedge counterparties receive the benefits of the first priority lien granted to the first lien agent on behalf of all first lien secured parties (including the hedge counterparties) and the hedge counterparties are deemed to agree that the first lien security interests are regulated by the intercreditor agreement and other loan documents. The hedge counterparties under U.S. intercreditors in syndicated bank financings generally have neither the ability to direct enforcement actions nor the right to vote their outstanding claims (including any votes in respect of enforcement decisions). Hedge counterparties protect their interests through the terms of their swap agreements with the borrower or guarantors such that a swap termination event occurs upon certain events (e.g., amendments to the hedge status under the intercreditor agreement, changes to distribution of collateral proceeds or termination of security).

Cash management obligations (e.g., treasury, depository, overdraft, credit or debit card, electronic funds transfer and other cash management arrangements) are often included as first lien obligations under U.S. second lien intercreditors on terms similar to the terms relating to the hedge obligations. Historically, European second lien intercreditors typically did not expressly contemplate cash management obligations, although this position is increasingly negotiated. In European financings, the cash management providers that are initial lenders would typically provide the cash management services through ancillary facilities – bilateral facilities provided by a lender in place of all or part of that lender's unutilised revolving facility commitment. Ancillary facilities are not a traditional feature of U.S. credit facilities, although increasingly common. The providers of ancillary facilities would be direct signatories of a European second lien intercreditor.

2. Enforcement

a. Enforcement Instructions

The first lien agent under a U.S. second lien intercreditor takes instructions from the lenders holding a majority of the loans and unfunded commitments under the first lien credit agreement, which follows the standard formulation of required lenders in U.S. first lien credit agreements. (Note, however, that the vote required to confirm a plan of reorganisation in a Chapter 11 proceeding is a higher threshold – at least two thirds in amount and more than one half in number of the claims actually voting on the plan.) Where there are multiple first lien facilities, typically the agent for the facility representing the greatest amount of loans and unfunded commitments is the “controlling” agent

acting for the first lien class, though in most cases the agent for the bank facilities (as opposed to a notes trustee) will be the controlling agent even if the bank facilities are smaller than outstanding senior secured notes.

The security agent under European second lien intercreditors, however, takes instructions from creditors holding 66⅔% of the sum of (i) the drawn and undrawn amounts under the senior credit agreement, and (ii) any actual outstanding liabilities (plus any mark to market value if the senior credit agreement has been discharged) under any hedging arrangements.

b. Enforcement Standstill Periods

U.S. second lien financings involve lien subordination as opposed to payment (also referred to as debt or claim) and lien subordination. The result of lien subordination is that only the proceeds of shared collateral subject to the liens for the benefit of both the first lien secured parties and second lien secured parties are applied to repayment in full of the first lien obligations before the second lien secured parties are entitled to receive any distribution of the proceeds of the shared collateral, but the second lien secured parties may receive other payments (such as payments of principal and interest and payments from other sources, e.g., unencumbered property) prior to the first lien obligations being paid in full. In the context of U.S. obligors, it is unlikely, in practice, that there would be substantial property that is unencumbered since the security granted would likely pick up substantially all assets – in contrast to a number of European obligors whose unencumbered assets may be significant due to local law limitations.

Payment subordination requires the junior lien creditors to turn-over to the first lien secured parties all proceeds of enforcement received from any source (including the proceeds of any unencumbered property) until the first lien obligations are paid in full. In consequence, the difference in recoveries between lien subordination and payment subordination could be significant in a financing where material assets are left unencumbered, as is likely in a financing in which much of the credit support is outside the U.S.

U.S. second lien intercreditors prohibit the second lien agent from exercising any of its rights or remedies with respect to the shared collateral until expiration of a standstill period (typically 90 to 180 days after notice delivered by the second lien agent to the first lien agent of a second lien event of default or, in some cases, if earlier, second lien acceleration). The standstill period becomes permanent to the extent the first lien agent is diligently pursuing in good faith an enforcement action against a material portion of the shared collateral or upon a bankruptcy proceeding filing. An exercise of collateral remedies generally includes any action (including commencing legal proceedings) to foreclose on the second lien agent's lien in any shared collateral, to take possession of or sell any shared collateral or to exercise any right of set-off with respect to any shared collateral, but the acceleration of credit facility obligations, filing a proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding or ensuring continued perfection on collateral are generally not considered an exercise of collateral remedies.

European second lien intercreditors typically contain a much broader enforcement standstill provision than U.S. second lien intercreditors, principally because there is no pan-European equivalent of the Chapter 11 automatic stay. The scope of the restricted enforcement actions typically prohibits any acceleration of the second lien debt, any enforcement of payment of, or action to collect, the second lien debt, and any commencement or joining in with others to commence any insolvency proceeding, any commencement by the second lien agent or second lien creditors of any judicial enforcement of any of the rights and remedies under the second lien documents or applicable law, whether as a secured or an unsecured creditor. The

enforcement standstill period has traditionally run for (i) a period of 90 days following notice of payment default under the senior credit agreement, (ii) a period of 120 days following notice of financial covenant default under the senior credit agreement (although this is much less common since the introduction of cov-lite financings in the European market), and (iii) a period of 150 days following notice of any other event of default under the senior credit agreement. However, the enforcement standstill period is now often subject to negotiation and in some deals, for example, it is 120 days following notice of the relevant event of default. In European second lien intercreditors, the senior creditors firmly control enforcement (other than in some exceptional circumstances). In addition, the senior agent is generally entitled to override the junior agent's instructions to the security agent, leaving the second lien lenders only able to influence the timing of enforcement action after the standstill period.

Because the enforcement standstill in U.S. second lien intercreditors is limited to enforcement against shared collateral, U.S. second lien lenders, unlike their European counterparts, retain the right (subject to the Chapter 11 stay) to accelerate their second lien loans and to demand payment from the borrower and guarantors during the standstill period. However, in the event any second lien agent or any other second lien creditor becomes a judgment lien creditor in respect of the shared collateral as a result of enforcement of its rights as an unsecured creditor (such as the ability to sue for payment), the judgment lien would typically be subordinated to the liens securing the first lien obligations on the same basis as the other liens securing the second lien obligations under the U.S. second lien intercreditor agreement. This judgment lien provision effectively limits the effectiveness of the junior lien creditors' efforts to sue for payment, since the junior lien creditors ultimately will not be able to enforce against shared collateral, although the junior lien creditors could still precipitate a bankruptcy filing and/or obtain rights against any previously unencumbered assets of the borrower and guarantors.

3. Payment Blockages

U.S. second lien intercreditors do not generally subordinate the junior lien obligations in right of payment to the first lien obligations.

While recent European second lien intercreditors do not subordinate the junior lien obligations in right of payment to the senior lien obligations, they include payment blockages which achieve the same outcome. Payment blockage periods are typically co-extensive with a payment default under the senior credit agreement and of a duration of 150 days during each year whilst certain other material events of default under the senior credit agreement are continuing. The second lien creditors may negotiate for exceptions to the payment blockage periods, e.g., payment of a pre-agreed amount of expenses related to the restructuring or a valuation of the borrower group (other than expenses related to disputing any aspect of a distressed disposal or sale of liabilities). In addition, separate payment blockage rules typically apply to hedge obligations, shareholder loan obligations and intragroup liabilities in European second lien intercreditors.

4. Releases of Collateral and Guarantees

In order to ensure that the junior lien creditors are unable to interfere with a sale of the shared collateral, both U.S. second lien intercreditors and European second lien intercreditors contain release provisions whereby the junior lenders agree that their lien on any shared collateral (and, in Europe, the underlying

debt and guarantee obligations) is automatically released if the first lien creditors release their lien in connection with a disposition permitted under both the first lien credit agreement and the second lien credit agreement and, more importantly, in connection with enforcement by the first lien creditors.

The release provisions are arguably the most important provision of European second lien intercreditors. Under European intercreditor agreements, in connection with enforcement by the senior creditors (or a "distressed disposal"), the junior security and debt and guarantee claims can be released (or disposed of) subject to negotiated conditions. Fair sale provisions are almost always included, i.e., public auction/sale process, court-administered process or independent fair value opinion. The LMA intercreditor agreement (and most market precedents) requires the security agent to take reasonable care to obtain a fair market price/value and permits the sale of group entities and release of debt and guarantee claims, and, in addition, the sale of second lien debt claims. European intercreditor agreements typically provide that the security agent's duties will be discharged when (although this list is not exhaustive): (i) the sale is made under the direction/control of an insolvency officer; (ii) the sale is made pursuant to an auction/competitive sales process (which does not exclude junior creditors from participating unless adverse to the sales process); (iii) the sale is made as part of a court supervised/approved process; or (iv) a "fairness opinion" has been obtained. Any additional parameters/conditions to the above will be negotiated, particularly in deals where the junior debt is privately placed or where specialist second lien funds are anchoring the second lien facility including: (i) the circumstances in which/whether the senior creditors are entitled to instruct a sale in reliance on a fair sale opinion rather than a public auction; (ii) terms of any public auction (i.e. how conducted, on whose advice, who can participate, who can credit bid); (iii) any requirement for cash consideration; and (iv) any information/consultation rights.

In addition to the release provisions, European second lien intercreditors typically allow (subject to the fair sale provisions discussed above) the security agent to transfer the junior lien debt, intragroup liabilities and/or shareholder loans to the purchasers of the assets in an enforcement situation. The disposal of liabilities option could be more tax efficient than cancelling the subordinated debt in connection with enforcement.

Many of these conditions with respect to sales of collateral are absent in U.S. second lien intercreditors because meaningful protections are afforded to silent creditor constituencies by the Uniform Commercial Code requirement for a sale of collateral to be conducted in a commercially reasonable manner and, in the case of a 363 sale process, by a court-approved sale in Chapter 11, as discussed more fully below.

In addition, the release provisions in U.S. second lien intercreditors are also premised on the first lien and second lien security interests being separately held by the first lien collateral agent and the second lien collateral agent and documented in separate, but substantially similar, documents that are meant to cover identical pools of collateral. In European second lien intercreditors, the release provisions assume that one set of security interests are held by one security agent on behalf of all of the creditors (senior and second lien).

5. Limitation on First Lien Obligations

U.S. second lien financings typically include a "first lien debt cap" to limit the amount of first lien obligations that will be senior to the second lien obligations. The analogous provision in European second lien intercreditors is referred to as "senior headroom". Amounts that exceed the first lien debt cap or

senior headroom will not benefit from the lien priority provisions in the intercreditor agreement. The “cushion” under the first lien debt cap or senior headroom is meant to allow for additional cash needs of the borrower group, whether as part of a loan workout or otherwise.

The first lien debt cap in U.S. second lien financings is typically 110% to 120% of the principal amount of the loans and commitments under the first lien facilities on the closing date plus up to 120% of the principal amount of any incremental facilities (or equivalent) permitted under the first lien credit agreement on the closing date. The first lien debt cap is sometimes reduced by the amounts of certain reductions to the first lien commitments and funded loans (other than refinancings), e.g. mandatory prepayments. The first lien debt cap does not apply to hedging obligations and cash management obligations, which are generally included as first lien priority obligations without limitation (although the amounts are regulated by the covenants in the credit agreements). In addition, interest, fees, expenses, premiums and other amounts related to the principal amount of the first lien obligations permitted by the first lien debt cap are first lien priority obligations, but are generally not limited by the cap itself. The trend in U.S. second lien financings is to allow for larger first lien debt caps or for the cap to not be set forth in the intercreditor agreement at all (and second lien creditors rely on their covenant protections against additional first lien debt in the second lien debt documentation). Additional capacity is also permitted in the case of DIP financings in the U.S. (as discussed below).

Senior headroom is typically set at 110% of senior term debt plus revolving commitments in traditional European second lien intercreditors, although the headroom concept is of limited relevance where (as is now common on top-tier sponsor deals) it has not been extended to cover incremental and other additional senior debt. Ancillary facilities that would be provided in European deals *in lieu* of external cash management arrangements would be naturally limited by the amount of the revolving commitments since they are made available by revolving credit facility lenders in place of their revolving commitments; however, with the increasing inclusion of separate intercreditor permissions for cash management facilities in European second lien intercreditor agreements on top-tier sponsor deals, this is of less relevance but naturally constrained by the cash management needs of the group. Hedging obligations are typically unlimited but naturally constrained to a degree by the fact that most credit agreements will restrict the borrower group from entering into speculative hedging.

6. Amendment Restrictions

In both U.S. second lien intercreditors and European second lien intercreditors, first lien lenders and second lien lenders traditionally typically specified the extent to which certain terms of the first lien credit agreement and the second lien credit agreement may not be amended without the consent of the holder of the other lien. Amendment restrictions are negotiated on a deal-by-deal basis and may include limitations on increasing pricing and limitations on modifications of maturity date and the introduction of additional events of default and covenants. The trend in both U.S. and European second lien intercreditors, in particular in financings of borrowers owned by private equity sponsors, is for no amendment restrictions. U.S. intercreditors generally require any liens granted to second lien creditors to be granted to first lien creditors on the same basis (and subject to the same subordination arrangement). In Europe, a similar principle applies (but this is subject to negotiated exclusions that are consistent with the limitations on the European security packages).

7. Purchase Options

Both U.S. second lien intercreditors and European second lien intercreditors contain similar provisions whereby the second lien creditors are granted the right to purchase the first lien obligations in full at par, plus accrued interest, unpaid fees, expenses and other amounts owing to the first lien lenders at the time of the purchase. This purchase option gives the second lien creditors a viable alternative to sitting aside during an enforcement action controlled by the first lien creditors by allowing them to purchase the first lien claims in full and thereby acquire the ability to control the enforcement proceedings themselves.

The European version of the purchase option is similar but also includes a requirement to buy out the hedging obligations, which may or may not be included in U.S. second lien intercreditors.

The triggering events for the purchase option in U.S. intercreditors vary. They generally include acceleration of the first lien obligations in accordance with the first lien credit agreement and the commencement of an insolvency proceeding. Other potential trigger events include any payment default under the first lien credit agreement that remains uncured and unwaived for a period of time and a release of liens in connection with enforcement on shared collateral. The triggering event for the European version of the purchase option also varies and may include acceleration/enforcement by the senior creditors, the imposition of a standstill period on second lien enforcement action or the imposition of a payment block.

8. Common U.S. Bankruptcy Waivers

First lien secured parties in the U.S. try to ensure that the first lien secured parties control the course of the Chapter 11 proceeding to the maximum extent possible by seeking advanced waivers from the second lien secured parties of their bankruptcy rights as secured creditors (and, in some cases, as unsecured creditors) that effectively render the second lien secured parties “silent seconds”. These waivers can be highly negotiated. However, U.S. second lien intercreditors routinely contain waivers from the second lien secured parties of rights to object during the course of a Chapter 11 proceeding to a debtor-in-possession facility (or “DIP facility”), a sale by the debtor of its assets free of liens and liabilities outside of the ordinary course of business during Chapter 11 proceedings, with the approval of the bankruptcy court (a section 363 sale) and relief from the automatic stay. (The automatic stay stops substantially all acts and proceedings against the debtor and its property immediately upon filing of the bankruptcy petition.)

The enforceability of the non-subordination-related provisions in U.S. second lien intercreditors is uncertain because there is conflicting case law in this area. However, garden-variety subordination-related provisions are regularly enforced by U.S. bankruptcy courts to the same extent that they are enforceable under applicable non-bankruptcy law pursuant to section 510(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.

The second lien creditors in U.S. second lien intercreditors provide their advanced consent to DIP facilities by agreeing that, subject to certain conditions (including a monetary limit to the size of the DIP facilities), they will not object to the borrower or any other obligor obtaining financing (including on a priming basis) after the commencement of a Chapter 11 process, whether from the first lien creditors or any other third-party financing source, if the first lien agent desires to permit such financing (or to permit the use of cash collateral on which the first lien agent or any other creditor of the borrower or any other obligor has a lien).

In the U.S., second lien claimholders often expressly reserve the right to exercise rights and remedies as unsecured creditors against any borrower or guarantor in accordance with the terms of the second lien credit documents and applicable law, except as would otherwise be in contravention of, or inconsistent with, the express terms of the intercreditor agreement. This type of provision, for the reasons articulated above, does not have a counterpart in and would be inconsistent with the underlying rationale of European second lien intercreditors.

9. Non-cash Consideration/Credit Bidding

The LMA intercreditor agreement includes explicit provisions dealing with application of non-cash consideration (including “credit bidding”) during the enforcement of security. Credit bidding facilitates debt-for-equity exchanges by allowing the security agent, at the instruction of the senior creditors, to distribute equity to senior creditors as payment of the senior debt or to consummate a pre-pack where the senior debt is rolled into a newco vehicle. However, as mentioned in section 4 above, the ability of the senior creditors to credit bid (in most market precedents) is subject to the negotiated “fair value” protections in respect of the junior creditors.

In the U.S., the term “credit bidding” refers to the right of a secured creditor to offset, or bid, its secured allowed claim against the purchase price in a sale of its collateral under section 363(k) of the Bankruptcy Code, thereby allowing the secured creditor to acquire the assets that are subject to its lien in exchange for a full or partial cancellation of the debt. In U.S. second lien intercreditors, the second lien creditors consent to a sale or other disposition of any shared collateral free and clear of their liens or other claims under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code if the first lien creditors have consented to the sale or disposition. However, the second lien creditors often also expressly retain the ability to credit bid their second lien debt for the assets of the borrower and guarantors so long as the first lien obligations are paid in full in cash. In European intercreditor agreements, the second lien creditors would not typically have an explicit right to credit bid their second lien debt.

10. The Holders of Shareholder Obligations and Intragroup Obligations

In addition to direct equity contributions, shareholder loans are often used in European capital structures. Shareholder loans are less common in U.S. capital structures and, if present in the capital structure, would likely be unsecured and subordinated to the credit agreement obligations under a separately documented subordination agreement (i.e., not included as part of the typical U.S. second lien intercreditor agreement) and would not typically be included in U.S. first lien/second lien intercreditor agreements. The treatment of intragroup liabilities is often negotiated by the borrower and arrangers in U.S. syndicated credit agreements and, although results differ, the intragroup liabilities are often required to be documented by an intercompany note and made subject to an intercompany subordination agreement. The intercompany subordination agreement would subordinate the intragroup liabilities to be paid by the loan parties to their credit facility obligations and would generally include a payment blockage in relation to intragroup liabilities payable by borrowers and guarantors under the credit facilities during the continuation of an “acceleration event”. In European second lien intercreditor agreements, both shareholder loan and intra-group loan liabilities are subordinated to

the first and second lien debt claims, but in the case of intra-group loans, have a similar blockage on payments or enforcement during the continuation of an “acceleration event”.

Blended Approach Taken in Recent Transatlantic Intercreditor Agreements

Recent intercreditor agreements for financings involving primarily non-U.S. companies in U.S. syndicated bank loan financings, and using NY law-governed loan documents, have taken different approaches to the intercreditor terms, which seem to be determined on a deal-by-deal basis depending on several considerations: (1) the portion of the borrower group’s business located in the U.S.; (2) the jurisdiction of organisation of the borrower; (3) the governing law of the other loan documents; (4) the likelihood of the borrower group filing for U.S. bankruptcy protection; (5) the relative negotiating strength of the junior lien creditors and the borrower, who will be inclined to favour future flexibility and lower upfront legal costs; and (6) the markets where (or investors to which) the syndicated debt is being distributed and the expected capital structure. For these and other reasons, seemingly similar financings have taken very different approaches. Some intercreditor agreements ignore the complexities of restructuring outside of the U.S. and simply use a U.S.-style intercreditor agreement; other similar financings have been documented using the opposite approach – by using a form of intercreditor agreement based on the LMA intercreditor agreement; and still other similar financings have sought to blend the two approaches or to adopt an intercreditor agreement in the alternative by providing for different terms (in particular different release provisions) depending on whether a U.S. or non-U.S. restructuring is to be pursued. Given all of these various considerations, Transatlantic Intercreditor Agreements remain varied. We have highlighted below some of the more interesting points:

- the parties typically have included the holders of intra-group liabilities and shareholder loans, following the European approach, and have embedded restrictions on payment of the intra-group liabilities and shareholder loans under certain circumstances;
- the enforcement instructions are typically required to come from a majority of the first lien loans and unfunded commitments in the U.S.-style while the actual exposures of hedge counterparties (plus mark to market positions post-credit agreement discharge) are taken into account in calculating that majority in the European style;
- the European-style release provisions discussed above generally have been included either as the primary method of release or as an alternative method in the event that a U.S. bankruptcy process is not pursued;
- in certain deals, enforcement standstill and turnover provisions have been extended to cover all enforcement actions and recoveries (broadly defined), rather than just relating to collateral enforcement actions;
- claim subordination of the second lien debt has typically *not* been included;
- the full suite of U.S. bankruptcy waivers from the second lien creditors generally have been included; and
- it is sometimes the case, based on the underlying rationale of European intercreditors, that secured or (above an agreed threshold amount) unsecured incremental and refinancing debt (whether *pari passu* or subordinated) is required to be subject to the intercreditor agreement, primarily to ensure it can be released upon an enforcement of this group. Note that it would be very unusual for a U.S. investor in New York law-governed unsecured debt to agree to an LMA-style intercreditor agreement.

In addition, other provisions appear in Transatlantic Intercreditor Agreements that will not be familiar to those accustomed to the typical U.S. second lien intercreditors, such as parallel debt provisions (a construct necessary in certain non-U.S. jurisdictions in which a security interest cannot be easily granted to a fluctuating group of lenders), expanded agency provisions for the benefit of the security agent and special provisions necessitated by specific local laws to be encountered (or avoided) during the enforcement process (e.g., French *saugarde* provisions and compliance with U.S. FATCA regulations).

Conclusion

As the number of financings that touch both sides of the Atlantic continues to rise and the complexity of such financings increases, the intercreditor arrangements for multi-jurisdictional

financings will continue to be important and interesting. Whilst there is not a standard or uniform approach to documenting such intercreditor terms, there is now a broad understanding on both sides of the Atlantic in relation to the different provisions and their underlying rationale. Accordingly, most transactions are implemented on a blended basis, combining many of the above-mentioned European or US elements into a US or European intercreditor, respectively. Having said this, as was the case with European second lien intercreditor agreements, a uniform approach is unlikely to emerge until the new forms of Transatlantic Intercreditor Agreement are stress tested in cross-border restructurings.

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Summary of Key Terms of U.S. Second Lien Intercreditor Agreements and European Second Lien Intercreditor Agreements			
Key Terms	Traditional U.S. Second Lien Approach	Traditional European Second Lien Approach	Hybrid/Transatlantic Approach
Parties to the Intercreditor Agreement	The first lien agent and the second lien agent and executed or acknowledged by the obligors.	The first lien agent and lenders, the second lien agent and lenders and the obligors, the obligors' hedge providers, ancillary facility lenders, the lenders of intra-group loans, the lenders of shareholder loans and the security agent.	Generally follows the European approach, except with respect to each lender executing the intercreditor agreement (agents sign on behalf of lenders).
Enforcement Instructions	First lien agent takes instructions from lenders holding 50% of the loans and unfunded commitments under the first lien credit agreement.	Security agent takes instructions from creditors holding 66⅔% (or 50.1% where this the applicable threshold in the second lien facility agreement) of the sum of (i) amounts under the senior credit agreement, and (ii) any actual exposure under hedging agreements.	Generally follows the U.S. approach, but may include hedge counterparties.
Scope of Enforcement Standstill Provisions	Only applies to enforcement against shared collateral (i.e., lien subordination).	Fulsome enforcement standstill including payment default and acceleration (i.e., payment subordination).	Generally follows the European approach, but depends on negotiation.
Length of Enforcement Standstill Provisions	Typically 180 days but could be from 90 to 180 days depending on negotiation.	Historically (i) 90 days (in most cases) following notice of payment default under the senior credit agreement, (ii) 120 days (in most cases) following notice of financial covenant default (where included) under the senior credit agreement, and (iii) 150 days (in most cases) following notice of any other event of default under the senior credit agreement, plus (in some cases) 120 days if the security agent is taking enforcement action, but where negotiated, could be 120 days or longer.	Generally follows the U.S. approach, but depends on negotiation.
Payment Blockages	None.	Included.	Generally not included.
Releases of Collateral and Guarantees	Releases of collateral included.	Releases of all claims included.	Generally follows the European approach.

Summary of Key Terms of U.S. Second Lien Intercreditor Agreements and European Second Lien Intercreditor Agreements			
Key Terms	Traditional U.S. Second Lien Approach	Traditional European Second Lien Approach	Hybrid/Transatlantic Approach
Limitation on First Lien Obligations	Traditionally included a cap of 110% to 120% of the principal amount of the loans and commitments under the first lien facilities on the closing date plus 100% to 120% of the principal amount of any incremental facilities (or equivalent) permitted under the first lien credit agreement on the closing date plus secured hedging and other secured obligations. Many syndicated transactions have gravitated towards the European approach.	Rarely included (dictated by the debt and lien covenant in the second lien facility agreement).	Similar to the U.S. approach.
Amendment Restrictions	May be included depending on negotiation, but typically very limited restrictions.	Historically included but limited to day-one senior credit agreement. Top-tier sponsor intercreditors tend to follow U.S. approach.	Generally follows the U.S. approach.
Second Lien Purchase Options (to purchase the First Lien Obligations)	Included.	Included.	Included.
Common U.S. Bankruptcy Waivers	Included.	Not included.	Included.
Non-Cash Consideration/Credit Bidding by First Lien Lenders	Included.	Included (in some circumstances).	Included.
Shareholder Obligations and Intragroup Obligations	Not included. Often covered by a separate subordination agreement.	Included.	Often included.
Material Unsecured Debt	Not included.	Sometimes included (above a threshold).	Generally not included.



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